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Abstract
We consider the problem of stealth communication over a multipath network in the presence of an active adversary.
The multipath network consists of multiple parallel noiseless links, and the adversary is able to eavesdrop and jam a subset
of links. We consider two types of jamming — erasure jamming and overwrite jamming. We require the communication
to be both stealthy and reliable, i.e., the adversary should be unable to detect whether or not meaningful communication
is taking place, while the legitimate receiver should reconstruct any potential messages from the transmitter with high
probability simultaneously. We provide inner bounds on the robust stealth capacities under both adversarial erasure and
adversarial overwrite jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose an activist (Alice) occasionally wishes to communicate with a news agency, say BBC (Bob), and can use several
social media accounts she has to do so. However, the government James is eavesdropping on some of these accounts (Alice
and Bob do not know which ones), and is able to jam (i.e., erase or corrupt) information on these. The goal is to ensure that (i)
the activist Alice can communicate with the BBC Bob even if the government James attempts to disrupt communication, and
(ii) Alice’s communication should be stealthy — any communication posted on the social media that James observes should
be explainable as “innocent behaviour”.
The classical information-theoretic security problem aims to hide the content of communication. However, in certain scenarios
the mere fact that communication is taking place should also be hidden. Stealth communication, first studied in [1] for Discrete
Memoryless Channels (DMCs), requires that the transmitter Alice should be able to reliably communicate with the legitimate
receiver Bob, and simultaneously ensure the communication is undetectable by a malicious adversary James. The work [2]
generalizes the communication medium from classical DMCs to networks, and particularly studies stealth communication over
a noiseless multipath network wherein James is able to eavesdrop on a subset of links.
Stealth communication is closely related to the well-studied covert communication problem. The major difference lies in
the assumptions on the innocent distribution (when no communication happens) — covert communication requires that, under
innocent transmission, the channel inputs must be the “zero symbols”, while stealth communication allows the inputs to follow
a non-zero innocent distribution. Prior work has successfully investigated the fundamental limits of covert communication under
different settings, including AWGN channels [3], DMCs [4], [5], Binary Symmetric Channels (BSCs) [6], etc. In particular,
instead of the broadly studied random noise channels, the work [7] shifts the focus to the adversarial noise channels, i.e.,
the channel between Alice and Bob can be maliciously jammed by James, and the coding scheme there should be resilient to
every possible (including even the worst) jamming strategy induced by James.
This paper builds upon the insights obtained in [7], [2]. Suppose Alice and Bob communicate over a multipath network,
which consists of C parallel noiseless links. Unlike [2] wherein James is only able to eavesdrop on a subset of links passively,
this work considers the situation in which James also has the ability to jam the same subset of links to disturb any potential
communication (even if he cannot detect the existence of communication). When Alice does not wish to communicate with
Bob, her transmissions on the C links are sampled according to an innocent distribution (known a priori to Bob and James).
When she is communicating with Bob, her transmissions are chosen from a codebook (also known a priori to Bob and James).
In both scenarios, James is able to control (eavesdrop on/jam) at most Z out of C links (where1 Z < C/2), but which subset
of links is controlled is not known to Alice and Bob. Note that using “conventional” error-correcting codes does not suffice
— the correlations introduced across links by such codes may reveal to James that Alice is indeed actively communicating.
James first estimates whether or not Alice is transmitting by observing the transmission patterns on the links he controls.
The stealth is measured via a hypothesis-testing metric — the communication is deemed to be stealthy if regardless of
James’ estimator, his probability of false alarm plus his probability of missed detection always approaches one asymptotically.
Afterwards, on the basis of his observations, James tries to adversarially jam the links he controls. We consider two types of
jamming — erasure jamming and overwrite jamming. Erasure jamming means that James can erase everything on the links
he controls, while overwrite jamming allows him to replace the original transmission with his carefully designed transmission
patterns.
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1It is impossible to communicate stealthily and reliably when Z ≥ C/2, since James can always “symmetrize” — send a fake message pretending to be
Alice (and using her codebook) on the (at least) half of the links he controls.
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2A. Comparison with Related Work
Since stealth communication allows a non-degenerate innocent distribution, the throughputs with guarantees on both stealth
and reliability, in this work and also in [1], [2], scale linearly in the blocklength (rather than being restricted by the square-root
law2 in usual covert communication setups). Another, somewhat technical difference, is that in our setup, the channel from
Alice to James is not known a priori to Alice and Bob because of James’ flexibility in choosing which subset of Z links to
sit on, as opposed to a fixed channel from Alice to James in most relevant work (other than [2], [8]).
This work inherits the eavesdrop-and-jam framework studied in [7] for covert communication. In both scenarios, the
jammer may cleverly design its jamming strategy based on his observations to disturb any potential communication, hence
the communication scheme should be robust to all possible jamming strategies. Without the stealth/covertness constraint, the
eavesdrop-and-jam framework has been investigated in myopic adversarial channels [9]–[11], correlated jamming channels [12],
and multipath networks [13].
Stealth communication over multipath networks is also studied in [2], however, the adversary there is passive. This work
builds on [2] by considering an active adversary, who can maliciously disturb the transmission. We provide achievability
schemes robust to active jamming for a subset of the parameter space. The rate achievable by these schemes is in general
smaller than in [2] since the links being controlled do not carry information anymore (under erasure jamming), or may even
carry misleading information (under overwrite jamming). Furthermore, we point out that the functionalities of the jammer in
this work is fundamentally different from [14], wherein the jammer is present to help Alice and Bob by sending “artificial
noise” to the eavesdropper (similar to the cooperative jamming [15] for security problem).
Reliable communication (without the stealth constraint) over a multipath network in the presence of a jammer has been
well-studied in the past. The work [16] shows that as long as Z < C/2, Alice and Bob can fully utilize the rest of links
to communicate, regardless of the types of jamming (either erasure or overwrite). Robustness against erasure jamming is
relatively straightforward while robustness against overwrite jamming requires non-trivial coding schemes (such as pairwise
hashing [16]). Similar results are obtained in this work while also taking stealth into account.
B. Our Contributions and High-level Intuition
Firstly, we provide an inner bound on the robust stealth capacity under erasure jamming. The channel between Alice and
James can be viewed as an aggregation of all the links controlled by James, while the channel between Alice and Bob can
be viewed as an aggregation of the complement of these links (since James erases everything on the links he controls). The
stealth constraint imposes a lower bound on the rate (as a consequence of the channel resolvability [4]), while the reliability
constraint imposes an upper bound. Moreover, as is standard in wiretap secrecy problems, creating an artificial noisy channel
at the encoder (or equivalently, adding an auxiliary random variable) may hurt James more than Bob, and in turn lead to a
higher throughput.
Coding against an overwrite jammer is significantly more non-trivial since all possible jamming strategies should be
considered. In this work we prove that there exists a coding scheme with positive rate that is resilient to every (including
even the worst-case) jamming strategy. The crux of our proof, as explained in Section IV-B, is to take advantage of James’
uncertainty about the message/codeword conditioned on his observations. This is inspired by the novel ideas in [10] for reliable
communication over myopic adversarial channels.
From a stealth perspective, the major challenge in this work is to design communication schemes that introduce redundancy
across the C links (so as to enable resilience to James’ jamming) without allowing the resulting correlation across links to
reveal to James that Alice is actually communicating.
While the focus of this work is on robustness to active jamming, it has not escaped our attention that composing our
schemes with well-known techniques in the information-theoretic literature allows us to get schemes that are secure against
both information leakage and active jamming attacks in this stealth communication setting. A full characterization of this
communication setting with trifold objectives is a source of ongoing investigation.
II. MODEL
Random variables and their realizations are respectively denoted by uppercase letters and lowercase letters, e.g., X and x.
Sets are denoted by calligraphic letters, e.g., X . Vectors of length-n are denoted by boldface letters, e.g., X and x. If the
single-letter distribution on X is PX , then the corresponding n-letter product distribution
∏n
i=1 PX is denoted by PX.
The multipath network consists of C parallel links L1, L2, . . . , LC , each link Li carries a symbol from the alphabet Xi per
time instant. The alphabet for all the links taken together is denoted by X = ∏Ci=1 Xi. Alice’s transmission status is denoted
by T ∈ {0, 1} — T = 0 if Alice is innocent, whereas T = 1 if Alice is active. The message M is either 0 (if Alice is
innocent) or uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , N} (if Alice is active). Note that no prior distribution is assigned to T and
only Alice knows T and M a priori. Let n be the blocklength (number of time instants). The length-n vector transmitted on
the j-th link is denoted by xj , and the collection of vectors on C links is denoted by x = [xT1 x
T
2 . . .x
T
C ]
T . Note that x can
also be viewed as a length-n vector over X . The system diagram is illustrated in Figure 1.
2The square-root law states that one can only transmit O(√n) bits covertly and reliably over n channel uses.
3Encoder (Alice) Decoder (Bob)
Estimation/
Jamming
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Fig. 1: System diagram
Innocent distribution: When Alice is innocent (T = 0), at each time instant t (1 ≤ t ≤ n), an innocent transmission pattern
on the C links is sampled according to the time-independent innocent distribution P innX ∈ P(X ), where P(X ) denotes the set
of all distributions on X . For any subset J ⊆ {L1, L2, . . . , LC}, the marginal innocent distribution is denoted by P innXJ . Over
n time instants, the corresponding n-letter innocent distribution (resp. n-letter marginal innocent distribution) is a product
distribution with the form P innX =
∏n
t=1 P
inn
X (resp. P
inn
XJ
=
∏n
t=1 P
inn
XJ
).
Encoder: Alice’s encoder Ψ(., .) takes the transmission status T and the message M as input, and outputs a length-n vector
X. If T = 1 and message m is transmitted, the encoder Ψ(1,m) outputs the corresponding length-n codeword X(m). The
codebook C is the collection of all codewords X(m), ∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, and the rate is defined as R , (logN)/n. If T = 0
(hence M = 0), the encoder Ψ(0, 0) outputs an innocent vector X according to the innocent distribution. We assume that the
codebook C is public, i.e., it is known to all parties, including the jammer.
Active distribution: The active distribution, averaged over all the codewords X(m) in the codebook C, is denoted by PˆX.
Similarly, for any subset J ⊆ {L1, L2, . . . , LC}, the marginal active distribution is denoted by PˆXJ .
James’ estimation and jamming: James is able to control any subset of links of size at most Z, and let J be the class of all
possible subsets of size at most Z. James selects a specific subset J ∈ J, which is unknown to both Alice and Bob a priori.
On the basis of his observation XJ and his knowledge about the codebook C, James estimates Alice’s transmission status T ,
and also non-causally jams the subset J to prevent reliable communication irrespective of his estimation.
Estimation: James’ estimator Φ(.) outputs a single bit Tˆ = Φ(XJ) to estimate Alice’s transmission status T . The stealth is
measured by the hypothesis-testing metric. Let α(Φ) = PrX(Tˆ = 1|T = 0) and β(Φ) = PrM,X(Tˆ = 0|T = 1) respectively be
the probability of false alarm and the probability of missed detection of an estimator Φ. Stealth communication requires that
regardless of which estimator Φ is chosen, α(Φ) +β(Φ) should approach one asymptotically.3 A classical result on hypothesis
testing [17] shows that the optimal estimator Φ∗ satisfies α(Φ∗) + β(Φ∗) = 1 − V(PˆXJ , P innXJ ), where V(PˆXJ , P innXJ ) ,
1
2
∑
xJ
|PˆXJ (xJ)− P innXJ (xJ)| is the variational distance between the marginal active distribution and the marginal innocent
distribution. Hence we say the communication is stealth if limn→∞V(PˆXJ , P innXJ ) = 0.
Jamming: James can also jam the subset J that he controls. Under erasure jamming, the transmission XJ (on the subset J)
is completely replaced by the erasure symbols ‘⊥’, while under overwrite jamming, XJ is replaced by a carefully designed
YJ . In particular, James is able to choose the jamming vector YJ stochastically according to any conditional distribution
PYJ |XJ ,C , since he knows XJ and the codebook.
Decoder: Bob receives Y through the multipath network.
1) Under erasure jamming, YJc = XJc on the subset Jc (where Jc denotes the complement of set J), and YJ equals the
erasure symbols ‘⊥’ on the subset J .
2) Under overwrite jamming, YJc = XJc on the subset Jc, and YJ is arbitrarily chosen by James.
Note that Bob can easily figure out the subset J under erasure jamming due to the appearance of ‘⊥’, while it is not the case
under overwrite jamming. Bob reconstructs the message Mˆ by applying his decoding function Γ(.) to his observation. The
3Note that even if James ignores the knowledge of XJ , a naïve estimator Φ˜ (which always outputs T = 0 or T = 1) can also guarantee α(Φ˜)+β(Φ˜) = 1.
Therefore, the definition for stealth communication implies that James’ optimal estimator Φ∗ cannot be much better than the naïve estimator Φˆ.
4probabilities of error under erasure and overwrite jamming are respectively defined as
P⊥e (Ψ,Γ) , max
J∈J
∑
t∈{0,1}
Pr(Mˆ 6= M |T = t),
P owe (Ψ,Γ) , max
J∈J
max
PYJ |XJ ,C
∑
t∈{0,1}
Pr(Mˆ 6= M |T = t).
Achievable rate: A rate R is said to be achievable under erasure jamming (resp. achievable under overwrite jamming) if
there exists an infinite sequence of codes (Ψn,Γn) such that each code in the sequence has rate at least R, and ensures
limn→∞V(PˆXJ , P innXJ ) = 0 and limn→∞ P
⊥
e (Ψn,Γn) = 0 (resp. limn→∞ P
ow
e (Ψn,Γn) = 0).
III. MAIN RESULTS
To facilitate the statement of our results, we first define an optimization problem (A), which includes an auxiliary random
variable U , for a fixed innocent distribution P innX and a non-negative integer Z < C/2 as follows:
(A) sup
PU ,PX|U
min
J∈J
I(U ;XJc)
subject to P innXJ =
∑
u
PU · PXJ |U , ∀J ∈ J, (1)
max
J∈J
I(U ;XJ) < min
J∈J
I(U ;XJc). (2)
The optimal value of (A) is denoted by K¯(P innX , Z). Consider another optimization
(B) sup
PX
min
J∈J
H(PXJc )
subject to P innXJ = PXJ , ∀J ∈ J, (3)
max
J∈J
H(PXJ ) < min
J∈J
H(PXJc ), (4)
and let the optimal value be K(P innX , Z). It is worth noting that K(P
inn
X , Z) is always bounded from above by K¯(P
inn
X , Z),
since (A) is equivalent to (B) by restricting U = X . As is usual in wiretap secrecy problems, Theorem 1 below shows that a
higher rate K¯(P innX , Z)−  is achieved by introducing an auxiliary variable U .
Theorem 1 (Erasure jamming). For any P innX and non-negative integer Z < C/2, the rate R = K¯(P innX , Z)−  is achievable
under erasure jamming for any small  > 0.
Remark 1 (Cardinality Bound). Bounding the cardinality of the auxiliary variable U is possible. Following standard cardinality
bound arguments (c.f. [18]), given any feasible (U,X) in (A), there always exists a feasible (U ′, X) with |U ′| ≤ |X |+2|J|−1
that yields the same objective value. The detailed proof can be found in Appendix D.
Compared with erasure jamming, dealing with overwrite jamming is much more challenging due to the fact that James,
knowing Alice’s codebook, may attempt to “spoof” Alice’s transmissions. Bob’s decoder should be robust to any jamming
strategy PYJ |XJ ,C , including the one that maximizes his probability of decoding error. However, our next result shows that
stealth communication is still possible.
Theorem 2 (Overwrite jamming). For any P innX and non-negative integer Z < C/2, the rate R = K(P innX , Z)− is achievable
under overwrite jamming for any small  > 0.
IV. PROOF SKETCHES OF THEOREMS 1 & 2
A. Erasure jamming (Theorem 1)
We point out that one can use either random binning (as proposed in [2]) or random coding to prove Theorem 1. We choose
the latter one to sketch the proof, and defer the detailed proof to Appendix B. The optimal distributions in optimization (A)
are denoted by PU and PX|U .
Encoder: Let R = minJ∈J I(U ;XJc)−  (for any small  > 0). For each message m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, where N = 2nR, the
intermediate codeword u(m) is generated according to the n-letter distribution PU. To transmit m, Alice chooses u(m) and
stochastically maps u(m) to x(m) with probability PX|U(x(m)|u(m)). The length-n codeword x(m) is transmitted over the
multipath network.
Decoder: Bob first determines the subset J (controlled by James) based on the erasure symbol ‘⊥’, and then applies typicality
decoding based on yJc . Note that yJc = xJc since the subset Jc is not controlled by James. He decodes to Tˆ = 1 and Mˆ = m
if there exists a unique m such that (u(m),yJc) are jointly typical, whereas Tˆ = 0 and Mˆ = 0 if there does not exist any m
such that (u(m),yJc) are jointly typical.
5Analysis: To satisfy the stealth constraint, one should guarantee that no matter which subset J is controlled by James, the
marginal active distribution PˆXJ is indistinguishable from the marginal innocent distribution P
inn
XJ
. Note that
PˆXJ (xJ) =
N∑
m=1
1
N
PXJ |U(xJ |u(m)), (5)
P innXJ (xJ) =
∑
u
PU(u)PXJ |U(xJ |u), (6)
Equation (6) follows from the constraint in (1), which ensures that the stochastic process
∑
u PU · PXJ |U simulated by the
encoder Ψ is identical to the marginal innocent distribution P innXJ . The constraint in (2) ensures the size of the codebook
to be large enough so that with high probability (w.h.p.) the active distribution PˆXJ is sufficiently close to
∑
u PU · PXJ |U
— it turns out that R > I(U ;XJ) is sufficient, as noticed in [4], from a channel resolvability perspective. To prove it, we
first denote the typical set of XJ by An,γXJ , and the jointly typical set (resp. joint type class) of U with respect to a typical
xJ by AUxJ (resp. TUxJ ). Recall that proving stealth is equivalent to bounding the variational distance V(P innXJ , PˆXJ ) =
1
2
∑
xJ
|P innXJ (xJ)− PˆXJ (xJ)|. For any typical xJ , we have∣∣∣P innXJ (xJ)− PˆXJ (xJ)∣∣∣
(a)≈
∣∣∣∣ ∑
u∈AUxJ
P (u)P (xJ |u)−
∑
m:u(m)∈AUxJ
1
N
P (xJ |u(m))
∣∣∣∣
(b)
≤
∑
TUxJ
∣∣∣∣ ∑
u∈TUxJ
P (u)P (xJ |u)−
∑
m:u(m)∈TUxJ
P (xJ |u(m))
N
∣∣∣∣
(c)
=
∑
TUxJ
P (xJ |u)
∣∣∣∣P (U ∈ TUxJ )− |m : u(m) ∈ TUxJ |N
∣∣∣∣, (7)
where the approximation (a) is obtained by discarding negligible atypical events, (b) is obtained by dividing the typical set
AUxJ into typical type classes TUxJ , and (c) follows since P (xJ |u) is identical for all u ∈ TUxJ . Note that
µ , EC (|m : u(m) ∈ TUxJ |) = N · P (U ∈ TUxJ ), (8)
which is exponentially large since P (U ∈ TUxJ ) ·= 2−nI(U ;XJ ) and N > 2nI(U ;XJ ). One can apply the Chernoff bound to
show that with probability at least 1− 2e− 13µε2n over the code design (super-exponentially close to one),∣∣∣P (U ∈ TUxJ )− |m : u(m) ∈ TUxJ |N ∣∣∣ ≤ εnP (U ∈ TUxJ ), (9)
where εn → 0 as n → ∞. Finally, by substituting (9) for (7), and taking a union bound over exponentially many TUxJ and
xJ , we prove that V(P innXJ , PˆXJ ) ≤ f(n) with high probability for some function f(·).
To guarantee reliability, we note that the effective channel between Alice and Bob is PXJc |U under erasure jamming, since
Bob has access to YJc = XJc noiselessly. Hence, random codes of rate R < minJ∈J I(U ;XJc) naturally ensure reliability.
Finally, we point out that the above analysis holds for every possible subset J ∈ J that James may choose.
B. Overwrite jamming (Theorem 2)
We first highlight two challenges for reliable decoding under overwrite jamming: 1) In contrast to erasure jamming, it is
not trivial for Bob to figure out which subset J ∈ J is controlled by James. In fact, our coding scheme described below
requires Bob to try every possible choice of J . 2) Though James can only control set J , he is not “completely blind” for the
complement set Jc. This is because Alice is constrained to using a stealth codebook, and hence any set of Z links must have
marginal distributions that look innocent. For instance, if James controls 2 out of 5 links (say links 1 and 2), he knows that
Alice’s transmissions on any other link j /∈ {1, 2} must have joint distribution with links in {1, 2} according to the innocent
distribution. Based on his observation XJ , James may learn something about the message M as well as the transmission XJc
on Jc. The ability to overwrite XJ , together with the partial knowledge about XJc , may make it possible for James to fool
Bob.
Nonetheless, as shown in Theorem 2, it is still possible for Alice and Bob to communicate at a positive rate, and we sketch
the proof as follows. Let PX be the optimal distribution in (B).
Encoder: Let R = minJ∈JH(XJc)− (for any small  > 0). For each message m, the codeword x(m) is generated according
to the n-letter distribution PX. Alice encodes m to x(m), and transmits x(m) over the multipath network. The codebook
C , {x(m)}Nm=1.
Decoder: Since Bob does not know the set J controlled by James a priori, he attempts to decode based on every possible
choice of Jˆ ∈ J and applies an erasure-like decoding on its corresponding decoding set Jˆc. For a specific Jˆ , Bob outputs a
6message m to his list L if there is a unique m such that xJˆc(m) = yJˆc , where xJˆc(m) is the sub-codeword of x(m) on set
Jˆc. This procedure is repeated for every Jˆ ∈ J. Bob decodes to Tˆ = 1 and Mˆ = m if the list L contains a unique message
m, decodes to Tˆ = 0 and Mˆ = 0 if the list L is empty, and declares an error otherwise.
Analysis: The proof for stealth is similar to that in Section IV, hence we focus on reliability only. When Alice is active (T = 1),
we assume M = m is transmitted and the subset J is controlled by James. First note that when Bob decodes according to
the “correct” decoding set Jˆc = Jc, the transmitted message m ∈ L w.h.p., since Jc is noiseless and the rate R < H(PXJc ).
Secondly, we argue that w.h.p., no other message m′ 6= m falls into L if Bob decodes according to any other Jˆc (Jˆ 6= J).
For any Jˆ 6= J , we partition Jˆc into disjoint subsets G and B, where G = Jˆc ∩ Jc is the “good set”, while B = Jˆc ∩ J is the
“bad set”. For convenience we consider the worst case wherein B = J (the decoding set Jˆc contains all the links controlled
by James). James is able to replace xJ with yJ according to an arbitrary distribution PYJ |XJ ,C , hence the probability of error
with respect to set Jˆc and PYJ |XJ ,C is given as
N∑
m=1
1
N
∑
yJ
P (yJ |xJ(m), C)1{(xG(m),yJ) ∈ C}, (10)
where the indicator function equals one if there exists a message m′ 6= m such that the sub-codewords of m′ on sets G and J
equals xG(m) and yJ respectively. By considering typical events only and gathering all messages with the same sub-codeword
on J together, we approximate (10) by
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∑
m:xJ (m)=xJ
1
N
∑
yJ
P (yJ |xJ , C)1{(xG(m),yJ) ∈ C}
=
1
N
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∑
yJ
P (yJ |xJ , C)
∑
m:xJ (m)=xJ
1{(xG(m),yJ) ∈ C}
=
1
N
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∑
yJ
P (yJ |xJ , C) ·
∣∣m : xJ(m) = xJ ∩ (xG(m),yJ) ∈ C∣∣. (11)
Lemma 1. For any yJ and typical xJ , with probability 1− 2−ω(n) over the code design (super-exponentially close to one),
a randomly chosen code C satisfies ∣∣m : xJ(m) = xJ ∩ (xG(m),yJ) ∈ C∣∣∣∣m : xJ(m) = xJ ∣∣ ≤ ε′n, (12)
where ε′n → 0 as n→∞.
Lemma 1 is the crux of our proof. It is relatively straightforward to show that on expectation the ratio between the numerator
and the denominator in (12) is a decaying function of n. One can use the Chernoff bound to concentrate |m : xJ(m) = xJ
∣∣,
since the generation of each codeword is independent. However, it is trickier to concentrate the numerator because of the
complicated dependencies among different codewords. To solve this problem, we construct a function with small Lipschitz
coefficients, and apply the McDiarmid’s inequality [19]. A detailed proof can be found in Appendix C.
We also need to take a union bound over exponentially many xJ and yJ . This implies no matter which xJ is received
and which yJ is overwritten by James, the induced probability of error is always bounded from above by ε′n. By applying
Lemma 1 and the union bound, with probability 1− 2−ω(n), we can bound (11) from above by
ε′n
N
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∑
yJ
P (yJ |xJ , C) ·
∣∣m : xJ(m) = xJ ∣∣ ≤ ε′n.
Finally, we need to consider all possible Jˆ 6= J . A union bound over all Jˆ ∈ J shows that w.h.p., there does not exist a fake
message m′ 6= m falling into L, which in turn implies the list L contains the correct message m uniquely.
When Alice is innocent (T = 0), a similar proof technique shows that L is empty with high probability. This concludes the
proof sketch for Theorem 2.
Remark 2. It would be interesting to see if it is possible to modify the proof technique above to show that the rate K¯(P innX , Z)−
is also achievable. The main challenge is to deal with the complicated joint typicality relationship among (u,yJ ,xG), since
we introduce an auxiliary variable U and use typicality decoding. We believe that the this proof strategy likely works and
conjecture the following achievability.
Conjecture 1. For any P innX and non-negative integer Z < C/2, the rate R = K¯(P innX , Z) −  is also achievable under
overwrite jamming for any small  > 0.
7APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARIES
Definition 1. The γ-strongly typical set An,γX with respect to PX is the set of x ∈ Xn such that N(x;x) = 0 if PX(x) = 0,
and ∑
x∈X
∣∣∣∣N(x;x)n − PX(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ, (13)
where N(x;x) is the number of occurrences of x in x.
The γ-strongly typical sets An,γU and An,γXJ (with respect to PU and PXJ respectively) are defined in a similar way.
Definition 2. The γ-strongly jointly typical set An,γUX with respect to PUX is the set of (u,x) ∈ Un × Xn such that
N(u, x;u,x) = 0 if PUX(u, x) = 0, and∑
u∈U
∑
x∈X
∣∣∣∣N(u, x;u,x)n − PUX(u, x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ, (14)
where N(u, x;u,x) is the number of occurrences of (u, x) in (u,x).
Definition 3. For any fixed typical x, We say u ∈ An,γUx if (u,x) ∈ An,γUX .
Remark 3. (a) we define the γ-strongly typical sets An,γU ,An,γXJ ,A
n,γ
XG , and γ-strongly jointly typical set A
n,γ
UXJ
,An,γXGXJ in a
similar way.
(b) It is worth noting that if (u,x) ∈ An,γUX , then both u ∈ An,γU and x ∈ An,γX .
APPENDIX B
Note that the n-letter innocent distribution P innXJ (xJ) on the subset J equals the stochastic processes PU and PXJ |U simulated
by the encoder Ψ. For a fixed xJ , by considering conditionally typical u and atypical u, we have
P innXJ (xJ) =
∑
u
PU(u)PXJ |U(xJ |u) (15)
=
∑
u∈An,γUxJ
PU(u)PXJ |U(xJ |u) +
∑
u/∈An,γUxJ
PU(u)PXJ |U(xJ |u). (16)
The active distribution PˆXJ (xJ) on the subset J (induced by the intermediate code C) equals
PˆXJ (xJ) =
N∑
i=1
PM (m)PXJ |U(xJ |u(m)) (17)
=
∑
m:u(m)∈An,γUxJ
PM (m)PXJ |U(xJ |u(m)) +
∑
m:u(m)/∈An,γUxJ
PM (m)PXJ |U(xJ |u(m)). (18)
By definition, the variational distance between P innXJ (xJ) and PˆXJ (xJ) equals
V
(
P innXJ , PˆXJ
)
=
1
2
∑
xJ
∣∣∣P innXJ (xJ)− PˆXJ (xJ)∣∣∣ (19)
=
1
2
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∣∣∣P innXJ (xJ)− PˆXJ (xJ)∣∣∣+ 12 ∑
xJ /∈An,γXJ
∣∣∣P innXJ (xJ)− PˆXJ (xJ)∣∣∣ (20)
≤ 1
2
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∣∣∣P innXJ (xJ)− PˆXJ (xJ)∣∣∣
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term (A)
+
1
2
∑
xJ /∈An,γXJ
P innXJ (xJ)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term (B)
+
1
2
∑
xJ /∈An,γXJ
PˆXJ (xJ)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term (C)
, (21)
8where (20) is obtained by dividing xJ into typical xJ and atypical xJ , and (21) follows from the triangle inequality. Note that
term (A) can further be divided into
(A) =
1
2
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∣∣∣P innXJ (xJ)− PˆXJ (xJ)∣∣∣ (22)
≤ 1
2
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
u∈An,γUxJ
PU(u)PXJ |U(xJ |u)−
∑
m:u(m)∈An,γUxJ
PM (m)PXJ |U(xJ |u(m))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term (A1)
(23)
+
1
2
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∑
u/∈An,γUxJ
PU(u)PXJ |U(xJ |u)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term (A2)
+
1
2
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∑
m:u(m)/∈An,γUxJ
PM (m)PXJ |U(xJ |u(m))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term (A3)
(24)
Term (B) and term (A2) correspond to XJ /∈ An,γXJ and U /∈ A
n,γ
UxJ (for a typical xJ ) respectively, hence both of the two
terms goes to zero as n goes to infinity. Term (C) and term (A3) correspond to similar atypical events but depends on the
specific codebook C. Prior work [6] shows that with high probability over the code design, both of the two terms approach to
zero as well as n goes to infinity. Hence we focus on term (A1) in the following.
(A1) =
1
2
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
u∈An,γUxJ
PU(u)PXJ |U(xJ |u)−
∑
m:u(m)∈An,γUxJ
PM (m)PXJ |U(xJ |u(m))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (25)
=
1
2
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
TUxJ
∑
u∈TUxJ
PU(u)PXJ |U(xJ |u)−
∑
TUxJ
∑
m:u(m)∈TUxJ
PM (m)PXJ |U(xJ |u(m))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (26)
=
1
2
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
TUxJ
PXJ |U(xJ |u)
(
PU (U ∈ TUxJ )−
|m : u(m) ∈ TUxJ |
N
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ (27)
Due to the linearity of expectation, we have
µ , EC (|m : u(m) ∈ TUxJ |) = N · PU (U ∈ TUxJ ) , (28)
which is exponentially large since N = 2nR > 2nI(U ;XJ ) and PU (U ∈ TUxJ ) ≈ 2nH(U |XJ )/2nH(U) = 2−nI(U ;XJ ). Since
the codewords u(m) are chosen independently, we can use the Chernoff bound to concentrate |m : u(m) ∈ TUxJ | around its
expectation:
Pr
C
(∣∣∣∣ |m : u(m) ∈ TUxJ |µ − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε1(n)) ≥ 1− 2 exp(−13µε21(n)
)
, (29)
where ε1(n)→ 0 as n→∞. For instance, we set ε1(n) = n−1. Hence
Pr
C
(∣∣∣∣PU (U ∈ TUxJ )− |m : u(m) ∈ TUxJ |N
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε1(n)PU (U ∈ TUxJ )) ≥ 1− 2 exp(−13µε21(n)
)
. (30)
Replacing (30) into (27), we have
(A1)
w.h.p.
=
ε1(n)
2
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
TUxJ
PXJ |U(xJ |u)PU (U ∈ TUxJ )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (31)
=
ε1(n)
2
∑
xJ∈An,γXJ
∑
TUxJ
∑
u∈TUxJ
PXJ |U(xJ |u)PU(u) (32)
≤ ε1(n)
2
∑
xJ
∑
u
PXJ |U(xJ |u)PU(u) (33)
≤ ε1(n)
2
=
1
2n
. (34)
By combining terms (A1), (A2), (A3), (B) and (C), we are able to prove that with high probability over the code design,
a randomly chosen code C satisfies limn→∞V(P innXJ , PˆXJ ) = 0 (for every J ∈ J).
9APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
By the strong asymptotic equipartition property (strong AEP), we know that for any typical xJ , there exists η(γ) > 0 such
that η(γ)→ 0 as γ → 0 and
2−n(H(XJ )+η(γ)) ≤ PXJ (XJ = xJ) ≤ 2−n(H(XJ )−η(γ)). (35)
Since PX satisfies equation (4) in optimization (B), we have
min
J∈J
H(XJc) > max
J∈J
H(XJ) ≥ H(XJ). (36)
Hence there exists δ > 0 such that minJ∈JH(XJc)−H(XJ) = δ. We let  δ and η(γ) δ.
Claim 1. For any typical xJ , with probability 1− 2−ω(n) over the code design,
|m : xJ(m) = xJ | ≥ (1− n−1) · 2n(δ−−η(γ)). (37)
Proof: The expected number of codewords such that their sub-codeword on J equals xJ is given as
EC (|m : xJ(m) = xJ |) = 2nR · PXJ (XJ = xJ) ≥ 2n(minJ∈JH(XJc )−) · 2−n(H(XJ )+η(γ)) (38)
= 2n(δ−−η(γ)), (39)
which is exponentially large since   δ and η(γ)  δ. Note that each of the codeword is chosen independently, hence by
the Chernoff bound,
Pr
C
(
|m : xJ(m) = xJ | ≥ (1− n−1)2n(δ−−η(γ)))
)
(40)
≥ Pr
C
(|m : xJ(m) = xJ | ≥ (1− n−1)EC(|m : xJ(m) = xJ |)) (41)
≥ 1− exp
(
−1
3
n−22n(δ−−η(γ))
)
= 1− 2−ω(n). (42)
Claim 2. For any yJ and typical xJ , with probability 1− 2−ω(n) over the code design,
|m : xJ(m) = xJ ∩ (xG(m),yJ) ∈ C| ≤ (1 + n−1)3 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ)) (43)
Proof: Let S = {m : xJ(m) = xJ ∪ xJ(m) = yJ} be a subset of messages such that each m ∈ S satisfies xJ(m) = xJ or
xJ(m) = yJ . Note that the size of S is tightly concentrated around EC(|S|) = 2 × 2n(δ−−η(γ)) by the Chernoff bound. In
particular, we have
Pr
C
(
|S| > 2(1 + n−1)2n(δ−−η(γ))
)
≤ 2−ω(n). (44)
It is worth noting that
|m : xJ(m) = xJ ∩ (xG(m),yJ) ∈ C| =
∑
xG
1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C}, (45)
hence we have
Pr
C
(
|m : xJ(m) = xJ ∩ (xG(m),yJ) ∈ C| > (1 + n−1)3 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ))
)
(46)
= Pr
C
(∑
xG
1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C} > (1 + n−1)3 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ))
)
(47)
=
N∑
i=0
Pr(|S| = i) Pr
C
(∑
xG
1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C} > (1 + n−1)3 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ))
∣∣∣|S| = i) (48)
≤
2(1+n−1)2n(δ−−η(γ))∑
i=0
Pr(|S| = i) Pr
C
(∑
xG
1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C} > (1 + n−1)3 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ))
∣∣∣|S| = i)
+ 2−ω(n) (49)
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Without loss of generality, suppose m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S and mi=1, . . . ,mN /∈ S if |S| = i. Note that
Pr
C
(∑
xG
1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C} > (1 + n−1)3 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ))
∣∣∣|S| = i) (50)
= Pr
C
(∑
xG
1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C} > (1 + n−1)3 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ))
∣∣∣m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S,mi=1, . . . ,mN /∈ S)
(51)
= Pr
C
(∑
xG
1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C} > (1 + n−1)3 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ))
∣∣∣m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S) . (52)
Equation (52) follows since the indicator function 1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C} is independent of the messages that does
not belong to S (for any m /∈ S, xJ(m) neither equals xJ nor equals yJ ). Let’s first consider the expectation
EC
(∑
xG
1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C}
∣∣∣m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S) (53)
=
∑
xG
EC
(
1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C}
∣∣∣m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S) (54)
=
∑
xG
Pr
C
(
(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C
∣∣∣m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S) (55)
n→∞
=
∑
xG∈An,γXGxJ
Pr
C
(
(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C
∣∣∣m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S) (56)
≤
∑
xG∈An,γXGxJ
Pr
C
(
(xG ,xJ) ∈ C
∣∣∣m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S)PrC ((xG ,yJ) ∈ C∣∣∣m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S) . (57)
Equation (56) follows from the negligibility of conditionally atypical xG , and inequality (57) is due to the fact that if one
codeword is fixed (and not equals (xG ,yJ)), the probability that the codebook contains (xG ,yJ) decreases. Note that for
xG ∈ An,γXGxJ , there exists a ν(γ) > 0 such that ν(γ)→ 0 as γ → 0 and
Pr
C
(
(xG ,xJ) ∈ C
∣∣∣m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S) ≤ 1− (1− 1
2
· 2−n(H(XG |XJ )−ν(γ))
)i
(58)
≤ 1−
(
1− 1
2
· 2−n(H(XG |XJ )−ν(γ))
)2(1+n−1)2n(δ−−η(γ))
(59)
≤ 1−
(
1− 1
2
· 2−n(δ−ν)
)2(1+n−1)2n(δ−−η)
(60)
= 1− e−(1+n−1)2n(δ−−η(γ)−H(XG|XJ )+ν(γ)) (61)
= (1 + n−1)2n(δ−−η(γ)−H(XG |XJ )+ν(γ)). (62)
Similarly,
Pr
C
(
(xG ,yJ) ∈ C
∣∣∣m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S) ≤ (1 + n−1)2n(δ−−η(γ)−H(XG |XJ )+ν(γ)). (63)
Combining (57), (62), and (63), we have
EC
(∑
xG
1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C}
∣∣∣m1,m2, . . . ,mi ∈ S) (64)
≤
∑
xG∈An,γXGxJ
(1 + n−1)2 · 22n(δ−−η(γ)−H(XG |XJ )+ν(γ)) (65)
≤ (1 + n−1)2 · 2n(H(XG |XJ )+ν(γ))22n(δ−−η(γ)−H(XG |XJ )+ν(γ)) (66)
≤ (1 + n−1)2 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ)), (67)
where (66) is obtained by noting |An,γXGxJ | ≤ 2n(H(XG |XJ )+ν(γ)), and inequality (67) follows since H(XG |XJ) = H(XGXJ)−
H(XJ) ≥ minJ∈JH(XJc) − H(XJ) = δ. We now use the McDiarmid’s inequality to concentrate
∑
xG 1{(xG ,xJ) ∈C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C}.
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Lemma 2 (McDiarmid’s inequality). Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent random variables taking values in ranges R1, . . . , Rn,
and let F : R1×· · ·×Rn → R be a function with the property that if one freezes all but the i-th coordinate of F (x1, . . . , xn)
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then F only fluctuates by most ci > 0, i.e.,
|F (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)− F (x1, . . . , xi−1, x′i, xi+1, . . . , xn)| ≤ ci, (68)
then for any λ > 0, one has
Pr(|F (X)− EF (X)| ≥ λσ) ≤ K exp(−kλ2) (69)
for some constants K, k > 0, where σ2 =
∑n
i=1 c
2
i .
Let X1 ∼ PX|X∈S ,X2 ∼ PX|X∈S . . . ,Xi ∼ PX|X∈S be the independent random variables corresponding to m1,m2, . . . ,mi.
Let F (X1, . . . ,Xi) =
∑
xG 1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C}. Note that EF (X1, . . . ,Xi) ≤ (1 + n−1)2 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ))
by (67), and cj = 1 ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i} since changing one codeword Xj only can at most fluctuate the function F (X1, . . . ,Xi)
by one. Therefore, by letting λ = (1+n
−1)3/2√
2n
2n(
1
2 δ− 32 −2η(γ)+3ν(γ)), we have
Pr
(
F (X1, . . . ,Xi) ≥ (1 + n−1)EF (X1, . . . ,Xi)
) ≤ K exp (−kλ2) = 2−ω(n). (70)
Therefore, we obtain
Pr
C
(∑
xG
1{(xG ,xJ) ∈ C ∩ (xG ,yJ) ∈ C} > (1 + n−1)3 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ))
∣∣∣|S| = i) ≤ 2−ω(n). (71)
Substituting (71) into (49) and taking a union bound over all typical size of |S|, we have
Pr
C
(
|m : xJ(m) = xJ ∩ (xG(m),yJ) ∈ C| > (1 + n−1)3 · 2n(δ−2−2η(γ)+3ν(γ))
)
≤ 2−ω(n). (72)
Finally, by combining Claims 1 and 2 and setting η(γ), ν(γ) , we obtain∣∣m : xJ(m) = xJ ∩ (xG(m),yJ) ∈ C∣∣∣∣m : xJ(m) = xJ ∣∣ ≤ (1 + n−1)2 · 2−n(+η(γ)−ν(γ)) = ε′n, (73)
which completes the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX D
CARDINALITY BOUND
We show that it suffices to give a finite cardinality bound to the auxiliary random variable U introduced in optimization (A).
Lemma 3 (Cardinality Bound). Bounding the cardinality of the auxiliary variable U is possible. Following standard cardinality
bound arguments (c.f. [18]), given any feasible (U,X) in (A), there always exists a feasible (U ′, X) with |U ′| ≤ |X |+2|J|−1
that yields the same objective value.
Proof: We use the support lemma [18] to give the proof. Given any (U,X) defined over U × X that satisfies the constraints,
let P be the set of all pmfs on X and PX|U=u ∈ P , indexed by u ∈ U , be a collection of conditional pmfs on X . We have
the following |X |+ 2|J| − 1 continuous functions on P
gj(pi) =

pi(j) j = 1, · · · , |X | − 1
H(XJ), ∀J ∈ J j = |X |, · · · , |X |+ |J| − 1
H(XJc), ∀J ∈ J j = |X |+ |J|, · · · , |X |+ 2|J| − 1
(74)
Clearly the first group of functions are continuous. The last two groups of functions are also continuous in pi due to the
continuity of entropy function and the linearity of marginal probabilities, i.e., PXJ (xJ) =
∑
xˆJ=xJ
pi(xˆ) and PXJc (xJc) =∑
xˆJc=xJc
pi(xˆ).
Now by the support lemma, there exists a random variable U ′ taking at most |X |+ 2|J| − 1 values such that∫
U
PX|U (x|u) dFU (u) = PX (x) =
∑
u′
PX|U ′ (x|u′)PU ′ (u′) ∀x ∈ X (75)
H(XJ |U) =
∫
U
H(XJ |U = u)dFU (u) =
∑
u′
H(XJ |U ′ = u′)PU ′ (u′) = H(XJ |U ′) ∀J ∈ J (76)
H(XJc |U) =
∫
U
H(XJc |U = u)dFU (u) =
∑
u′
H(XJc |U ′ = u′)PU ′ (u′) = H(XJc |U ′) ∀J ∈ J (77)
12
Note that PX(x) also determines XJ and XJc , then H(XJ) and H(XJc) are also preserved. Therefore, we have
I(XJ ;U) = H(XJ)−H(XJ |U) = H(XJ)−H(XJ |U ′) = I(XJ ;U ′) ∀J ∈ J (78)
I(XJc ;U) = H(XJc)−H(XJc |U) = H(XJc)−H(XJc |U ′) = I(XJc ;U ′) ∀J ∈ J (79)
Hence we can prove the arguments by substituting U by U ′ in the optimization problem using the equalities (75), (78) and
(79).
REFERENCES
[1] J. Hou and G. Kramer, “Effective secrecy: Reliability, confusion and stealth,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT), 2014, pp. 601–605.
[2] S. Kadhe, S. Jaggi, M. Bakshi, and A. Sprintson, “Reliable, deniable, and hidable communication over multipath networks,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp.
Inf. Theory (ISIT), 2014, pp. 611–615.
[3] B. A. Bash, D. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, “Limits of reliable communication with low probability of detection on AWGN channels,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas
Commun., vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 1921–1930, 2013.
[4] M. R. Bloch, “Covert communication over noisy channels: A resolvability perspective,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 5, pp. 2334–2354, May
2016.
[5] L. Wang, G. W. Wornell, and L. Zheng, “Fundamental limits of communication with low probability of detection,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 62,
no. 6, pp. 3493–3503, 2016.
[6] P. H. Che, M. Bakshi, and S. Jaggi, “Reliable deniable communication: Hiding messages in noise,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT), 2013,
pp. 2945–2949.
[7] Q. Zhang, M. Bakshi, and S. Jaggi, “Covert communication over adversarially jammed channels,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.02426, 2018.
[8] L. H. Ozarow and A. D. Wyner, “Wire-tap channel II,” Bell Labs Technical Journal, vol. 63, no. 10, pp. 2135–2157, 1984.
[9] A. D. Sarwate, “Coding against myopic adversaries,” in Proceedings of IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2010, pp. 1–5.
[10] B. K. Dey, S. Jaggi, and M. Langberg, “Sufficiently myopic adversaries are blind,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT), 2015, pp. 1164–1168.
[11] Y. Zhang, S. Vatedka, S. Jaggi, and A. Sarwate, “Quadratically constrained myopic adversarial channels,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.05951, 2018.
[12] M. Médard, “Capacity of correlated jamming channels,” 2013.
[13] Q. Zhang, S. Kadhe, M. Bakshi, S. Jaggi, and A. Sprintson, “Talking reliably, secretly, and efficiently: A “complete” characterization,” in IEEE Inf.
Theory Workshop (ITW), 2015, pp. 1–5.
[14] T. V. Sobers, B. A. Bash, S. Guha, D. Towsley, and D. Goeckel, “Covert communication in the presence of an uninformed jammer,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 6193–6206, 2017.
[15] R. Bassily, E. Ekrem, X. He, E. Tekin, J. Xie, M. R. Bloch, S. Ulukus, and A. Yener, “Cooperative security at the physical layer: A summary of recent
advances,” IEEE Signal Process. Mag., vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 16–28, 2013.
[16] S. Jaggi, M. Langberg, T. Ho, and M. Effros, “Correction of adversarial errors in networks,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT), 2005, pp.
1455–1459.
[17] E. L. Lehmann and J. P. Romano, Testing statistical hypotheses. Springer Science & Business Media, 2006.
[18] A. El Gamal and Y.-H. Kim, Network information theory. Cambridge university press, 2011.
[19] C. McDiarmid, “On the method of bounded differences,” Surveys in combinatorics, vol. 141, no. 1, pp. 148–188, 1989.
